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論文内容の要旨
Chapter 1. Introduction, Research Background and Objective 
Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) show an alternative way of communication, where wireJess nodes 
cooperate with one another to forward packets 合om a source to the appropriate destination, in a multi-hop 
fashion. Each MANET node coJJects information from its one-hop neighbors. Thus, MANETs nodes do not 
need to know about the whoJe network topology. In other words, there is no need for a centralized 
infrastructure in a MANET. This design consideration for MANETs makes a number of differences to the 
conventional centralized networks. namely: a) dynamic topology; b) resource constraints; c) lower cost; d) 
Jimited physical security. 
These features have their pros and cons in MANETs. For instance, MANET nodes are able to roam freely at 
certain speed. While this feature allows for suft?ient tlexibility in deploying a network, itmay also lead to 
unpredictable situations whereby the nodes may move too far away and become isolated. On the other hand , 
MANET nodes may be notebook computers, cell phones or even PDAs that are usually suffer from relatively 
short battery life. In addition, MANETs are meant to be deployed swiftly without infrastructures (e.g., base 
stations or access points), which cuts considerable cost. Finally, MANETs suffer from Iimited physical security. 
This is due to the fact that mobile tenninals (e.g. , notebooks, PDAs句 and so forth) usually do 10t have 
sufficiently strong secure hardware as they increase cost and power-col1sumption. Indeed, the usability and 
reliability ofMANETs strongly depend on its securi句人
However, because of its openness and lack of centralized services, it is stil quite an endeavor to create a secure 
environment for MANETs. The fact remains that it is quite difficult to ensure confidcntiality and allthenticity in 
MANETs. 
MANET issubjected to a number of attacks, ranging from rather simple to sophisticated ones. For instanceヲ a
selfish node in the MANET may not be willing to rollte packets to others. lt may also discard data packets that 
it received 仕om other nodes. On the other hand, more sophisticated routing attacks against MANETs may 
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disrupt route discovery. Furthermore, they may disrupt the route maintenance by disobeying the routing 
protocols. Blackhole attack, Byzantine attack, wormhole attack，制ld spoofing attack are illustrations of various 
significant threats to MANETs. 
For the pu中oseof secure group communications, cryptography has been incorporated into MANETs. Among 
the most popular techniques, Symmetric and Public Key In合astructuresare worth mentioning. 
In the former，れ1VOor more users are able to establish secure communications by sharing a common secret key. 
However, in a MANET with a large number of nodes, private key agreement protocols tend to require 
numerous message exchanges, which consequently cause significant overheads. Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) employs a pair ofkeys to encrypt and/or decrypt the messages. Whi1e the private keys need to be kept 
secret by both pa目ies，the public keys can be widely distributed. In addition, PKI reduces the communication 
overhead. However, deploying PKI in MANETs demands for a trusted third party 錨 theCertificate Authority 
(CA). Providing an online CA presents an enormous technical chal1enge in a MANET due to its dynamic 
topology. As a consequence, the public key-based authentication service for the MANET should be both 
decentralized and autonomous. 
To this end, we present a novel PKI-based key management protocol in this paper. The key management 
protocol ensures secure admission control in MANET environments. In our protocol, we assign the 
responsibilities ofthe authenticator to multiple CAs, which are selected from a pool ofusers with the highest 
trust levels. In our approach, we do not reso口 tomanual selection ofCAs as that in the work ofMOCA. We 
rather employ a Certificate Graph (CG) to represent the friendship amongst the participants. Our approach is 
similar to human social networks in which good (i.e., non-malicious) users are expected to have more friends 
than bad (i.e., malicious) ones. The most trustworthy subset ofthese good users in a MANET isrepresented by 
the maximum clique and is selected as the authenticator ofthis group. 
We introduce a novel key management protocol to perform admission control for MANETs. Inspiration comes 
from MOCA. We combine the benefits ofboth certificate graphs and CAs. By searching for the maximum 
cJique in certificate graphs we find the most trustworthy nodes. Then we assign CA responsibilities to these 
clique nodes. The details of our proposed scheme are presented in the remainder ofthis section. 
Wejustifシ thereasons for choosing the maximum cJique ぉ CA in a MANET as follows. First, maximum 
cliques are found by the MANET nodes themselves. Since they are not manuaIJy selected, this ensures a deｭ
centralized 創ldautonomous in仕astructuresuitable for MANET topologies. Second, in a mobile network with 
more than one CA, it is obvious th剖 everyCA should be familiar with the other CAs by knowing their public 
keys. Besides, certificates stored at different CAs must be consistent. Otherwise, the CAs may present 
conf1icting certificates to one another. In a maximum clique derived from a given 恥ι屯NET topology, each 
member in the clique knows its other members. ln other words, there doesn1t exist two members that are 
stranger to each other. This ensures close cooperation amongst the CAs. In addition、 theconsidered network 
may consist ofboth malicious and non-malicious users. For instance, some malicious users may be selfish and 
disrupt the packet routing. Similar to social networks, the good (i.e., non-malicious) users in a MANET are 
trusted by more nodes in the envisioned maximum clique based approach. On the other hand, the malicious 
users with lower trust levels are le食 with zero or few friendly neighbors to communicate with. Thus, by 
constructing the maximum clique, we actually establish the most trustworthy subset ofthe good users in the 
mobile ad hoc network. 
To integrate admission control scheme into MANET, we extend AODV protocol with our key management 
function. In our proposed scheme, CA selection proceeds as the following three steps. 
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(1) Issuing certificate. The protocol begins with issuing of certificates. At this stage, users issue certificates for 
their trustworthy neighbors. 
(2) Exchange of certificates. These certificates can be exchanged amongst the nodes, which are considered as 
friends. This is achieved by exchanging the certificate chain packets with friends. 
(3) Searching for the maximum clique in CG. The result of issuing and exchanging certificates is a CG. With 
the CG, users can gain knowledge oftheir respective neighbors. By searching for the maximum clique in the 
CG, a user can find a subset of nodes, which are the maximum clique members. These maximum clique 
members are selected as CAs. 
We use identity-based key exchange protocol 仕om pairing for encryption. By using the CK model, we say that 
a key exchange protocol is secure if under the allowed adversarial actions it is impossible for the attacker to 
distinguish the value of a key generated by the protocol from an independent random value. 
Chapter 2. Wireless Ad Hoc Network Architecture and Secllrity Isslles 
In this chapter, we focus on the stlldy ofwireless ad hoc network. In sllch kind ofnetwork, wireless nodes 
cooperate with one another to forward packets from a source to the appropriate destination, in a mlllti-hop 
fashion. Each node col1ects information from its one-hop neighbors. Thus, wireless nodes do not need to know 
about the whole network topology. In other words, there is no need for a centralized infrastructure in such kind 
of network. This design consideration makes a number of differences to the conventional centralized networks. 
For instance, wireless nodes are able to roam 仕eely at certain speed. While this feature allows for sllfficient 
f1exibility in deploying a neれiVork， it may also lead to unpredictabJe situations whereby the nodes may move too 
far away and become isoJated. On the other hand, wireless nodes may be notebook computers, cell phones or 
even PDAs that are usual1y suffer 仕omrelatively short battery life. In addition, they are meant to be deployed 
swiftJy without in合astructures (e.g., base stations or access points), which cuts considerable cost. Finally, they 
suffer from limited physical security. This is due to the fact that mobile terminals (e.g., notebooks, PDAs, and 
so forth) uSllal1y do not have sufficiently strong secure hardware as they increase cost and power-consumption. 
Indeed, the usability and reliability ofthe network strongly depend on its security. 
Because of its openness and lack of centralized services, wireless ad hoc network is subjected to a number of 
attacks, ranging from rather simple to sophisticated ones. For instance, a selfish node in the network may not be 
willing to route packets to others. It may also discard data packets that it received from other nodes. On the 
other hand, more sophisticated routing attacks against the network may disrupt route discovery. Furthermore, 
they may disrupt the route maintenance by disobeying the routing protocols. Blackhole attack, Byzantine attack, 
wormhole attack, and spoofing attack are illustrations ofvarious significant threats to the wireless ad hoc 
network. 
Chapter 3. Public Key In企astructurebased Certification 
In this chapter, we focus on the utilization of Public Key In合astructure(PKI) for certification inside wireless ad 
hoc network. PKI employs a pair of keys to encrypt and/or decrypt the messages. While the private keys need 
to be kept secret by both parties, the public keys can be widely distributed. In addition, PKI reduces the 
communication overhead. However, deploying PKI in wireless ad hoc network demand~ for a trusted third 
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party as the Certificate Authority (CA). Providing an online CA presents an enormous technical challenge due 
to dynamic topology ofthe network. As a consequence, the public key-based authentication service for the 
wireless ad hoc network should be both decentralized and autonomous. To this end, we present a novel PKI・
based key management protocol. We apply Certificate Graph (CO) and identity-based security in designing a 
security scheme for wireless ad hoc networks. We first use one占opmessage exchange to build CG at each 
mobile node. Then we select maximllm clique nodes in CG as distribllted CAs. 
Chapter 4. Message Authentication and Secure Session 
In this chapter, we focus on the detail ofmessage authentication ofthe proposed protocol. In data 
communication between any pair ofnodes, we encrypt each session with a session secret key. We first describe 
the encrypted session. Then we prove the security using Canetti Krawc勾rk(CK) model. With the CK model, 
we say that a key exchange protocol is secure if under the allowed adversarial actions it is impossible for the 
attacker to distinguish the value of a key generated by the protocol from an independent random value. 
In Chapter 5, we conclude the overall thesis and discuss the 白制reworks. 
「O
論文審査結果の要旨
無線端末が協力して目的ノードまでパケットを転送するマルチホッフ通信を用いるモパイ
ルアドホックネットワーク (MANET: Mobile Ad Hoc NETwork)は新たな通信方式として注
目されている。 MANET では、各端末が近隣ノードのみから情報を取得するため、ネットワ
ーク全体を知る必要がない。言い換えれば、 MANET は集中型の基盤を必要としないもので
ある。
分散型の MANET は従来の集中型のネットワークとは次の点で異なる。( 1 )動的なトポ
ロジ、 (2 )資源の制限、 (3) 安価なネットワーク構築、 (4) 物理的セキュリティによる脆
弱性。開放性と分散性の 2 つの特徴を有する MANET のセキュリティは機密性と信頼性に依
存するが、これらを保証する安全な環境構築は困難である。この問題に対して、本論文は、
新しい認証の手法を提案し、解析およびシミュレーション実験により有用性を確認している。
本論文は全編 5 章からなる。
第 1 章は序論であり、本研究の背景と目的について述べている。
第 2 章では、攻撃に対する既存のアドホックネットワークフロトコルや普遍的なセキュリ
ティ手法について詳しく述べている。さらに、攻撃に対応可能なアドホックネットワークプ
ロトコルの重要性を指摘し、攻撃といった脅威に対応するための適切なアーキテクチャの必
要性を述べ、本研究の基本的な考え方を示している。
第 3 章では、 MANET における安全な通信を保証するいくつかの関連手法を示し、問題点
を明らかにしている。続いて鍵の中央管理が困難なため、無線アドホックネットワークにお
ける認証基盤として、共通鍵暗号方式ではなく公開鍵暗号方式を導入している。さらに、認
証グラフと認証局を結合したクリークに基づく分散型認証局を提案している。提案手法は認
証グラフから最大クリークを探索することで最も信頼のおける端末を発見し認証局とするも
ので、既存の手法に比べて認証の性能が大きく向上していることをシミュレーションによっ
て確認している。これは実用上大きな成果である。
第 4章では、無線通信における安全な通信を保証するためのフロトコルを実装した暗号化
アルゴリズムを詳細に述べている。また、いずれの端末聞の通信においても、このアルゴリ
ズムは通信を安全に暗号化できることを示している。具体的には Diffie-Hellman 鍵共有プロ
トコルとハッシュに基づくメッセージ認証符号をベースに Canetti Krawczyk モデルを用い
て安全性を証明している。この成果はアドホックネットワークの安全通信に貢献するもので
高く評価できる。
第 5 章は結論であり、本研究の成果をまとめている。
本論文では、 MANET における安全な鍵管理方式を提案した。提案手法は分散型の認証で
ありながら高い認証率と短い反応時間を保証し、認証の失敗を減少させている。本研究の成
果は応用情報科学並びに情報通信技術の発展に寄与するところが少なくない。
よって、本論文は博士(情報科学)の学位論文として合格と認める。
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